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THE RAILROADS MUST HAVE TIES: 
A LEGAL HISTORY OF 
FOREST CONSERVATION AND THE 
OREGON & CALIFORNIA RAILROAD 
LAND GRANT, I887-I9I6 
SEAN M. KAMMER 
aturalist and preservationist John A Muir once 
scoffed at the way each of the transcontinental railroads advertised 
its line as the "scenic route." In his monumental portrayal of 
America's scenic wilderness areas, Our National Parks, he 
proposed a new and much more honest advertisement: "Come! 
Travel our way. Ours is the blackest. , .. The sky is black and 
the ground is black, and on either side there is a continuous 
border of black stumps and logs and blasted trees appealing to 
heaven for help as if still half alive, and their mute eloquence 
is most interestingly touching, . , , No other route on this 
continent so fully illustrates the abomination of desolation. III 
Observations such as this one regarding the ecological 
destructiveness of railroads have tended to obscure the fact 
that railroad companies themselves were not necessarily 
enemies of the environment. Indeed, in some cases they were 
at the forefront of the preservationist and conservationist 
movements that were still in their infancy at the time of 
Muir's writing in 1901. For example, the Southern Pacific, as 
historian Richard Orsi has demonstrated, Iltook a major role 
IJohn A. Muir, Our National Parks (Boston, 1901),357-58, 
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in the emergence of modern management of water, wilderness 
parks, forests, and rangelands. 112 
Orsi's conclusions regarding Southern Pacific contra-
dict the traditional view of that company as a "malevolent 
monopoly representing selfish, greedy, corporate interests!! 
in opposition to the "people" and the "public interest."3 But 
historians have! for the most part! left unchallenged a similar 
negative view of Edward H. Harriman, who headed both the 
Union Pacific and the Southern Pacific and was perhaps the 
most powerful of the railroad tycoons during the first decade 
of the twentieth century.4 Prior to Harriman's takeover of the 
Southern Pacific in 1901, that railroad's long-standing policy 
had been to subdivide and sell lands to farmers, miners, and 
loggers, the purpose being lito encourage long-term settlement, 
economic growth, and rail traffic," but Harriman questioned 
and ultimately rejected this policy.s In January 1903, he ordered 
the termination of sales of the remaining Southern Pacific land 
grant, including the heavily timbered lands of the Oregon and 
California Railroad, which had been a Southern Pacificsubsid-
iary since 1887. 
It remains unclear whether Harriman initially intended for 
this suspension to be temporary in order to allow his men to 
ascertain fully the nature of his extensive land holdings, or 
whether this move in fact represented a permanent shift in 
pohcy.6 What is clear is that by 1905 virtually sales ceased. 
Local Oregonians, as well as prominent lumber companies 
and politicians in the state, accused Harriman of undermin-
ing Oregon's development, and a political movement there 
ultimately led the federal government in 1908 to sue Harriman's 
Oregon & California Railroad for the forfeiture of its unsold 
lands. At the culmination of a seven-year legal battle, the 
2Richard ). Orsi, Sunset Limited: The Southern Pacific Railroad and the Devel-
opment of the American West, 1850-1930 (Berkeley, CA, 2005), xiv-xv. 
3!bid., xvii. 
4See, e.g., David Maldwyn Ellis, "The Oregon and California Railroad Land 
Grant, 1866-1945," Pacific Northwest Quarterly 39:411948): 255-83. Regard-
ing the termination of land sales in January 1903, Ellis asserts that "appar-
ently his aim was to keep for his company any rise in stumpage values." Ellis, 
"Oregon and California Railroad Land Grant," 261. 
50rsi, Sunset Limited, 37. 
60rsi found evidence that the termination of land sales was, in fact, meant to 
be a permanent policy. This is contradicted, however, by the later testimony of 
Harriman's land commissioner, Charles W. Eberlein, that the termination-at 
least as applied to all of the lands of the Southern Pacific, Central Pacific, and 
Oregon & California-was merely to allow Harriman and his centralized land 
office to ascertain the nature of the lands, a process delayed by the San Francisco 
earthquake and fire a couple of years later. See Orsi, Sunset Limited, 123-25. 
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Supreme Court gave Congress the legal authority to seize the 
land and to provide for its disposition "in accordance with 
such policy as it may deem fitting "-and Congress quickly 
passed the Chamberlain-Ferris Act of 1916, which revested the 
remaining 2.3 million acres of the grant to the United States. 
Although historians have, for the most part, accepted the view 
that Harriman's land policies in Oregon were motivated by his 
apparently unrivaled speculative spirit, his policies were in 
fact consistent with utilitarian notions of conservation that he 
recognized as in keeping with his long-term profit motive. 
The railroad issues that arose in the first decade of the 
twentieth century were rooted in the land-use regime Congress 
had established decades earlier. In the middle of the nine-
teenth century, federal land grants to railroads were a critical 
component of the government's effort to conquer its newly 
expanded public domain. Stephen Douglas orchestrated the 
first such grant to the Illinois Central in 1850, made possible 
by his compromise to grant lands in a checkerboard pattern as 
a way to pay for the subsidy. The granting of public lands to 
railroads escalated during the Civil War with Congress' passage 
of the Pacific Railway Act of 1862, which chartered and granted 
lands to the Union Pacific and the Central Pacific to aid in the 
construction of a railway from a point on the Missouri River in 
Nebraska to a point on the Pacific Ocean at or near San Francisco, 
and to the Leavenworth, Pawnee and Western Railroad for the 
construction of a southern branch through Kansas. 7 This policy 
continued in subsequent years with similar grants to aid in 
the construction of transcontinental railways to the north and 
south of the Union Pacific-Central Pacific line. In all, the fed-
eral government granted roughly 130 million acres to railroads 
(37 million of which were granted to railroads via the states) 
from 1850 to 1871. 
Railroad land grants shared several common features (as 
amended, if not originally): "rights-of-way" easements for 
the construction of the railwaysj including the right to use 
materials in the vicinity for construction and maintenance 
of the lines; the delineation of place limits within which the 
railroads' grants were contained (these ranged from ten miles 
to forty miles on each side of the railway); checkerboard 
provisions whereby the railroads' grants contained only 
alternate sections; the exclusion of mineral lands (other than 
coal and iron) and lands already settled, claimed, or reserved 
pursuant to federallawsj and the provision for indemnity 
7Pacific Railway Act of Tuly 1, 1862, 12 Stat. 489, Statutes at Large, 37th Cong., 
2d sess., ch. 120. 
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strips outside of the place limits within which the railroads 
could select lands in lieu of excluded place lands. In addi-
tion, some grants contained restrictions on the timing and 
manner of the railroads' disposition of lands to which they 
had received patents. 8 
As part of this general land grant policy, Congress in 1866 
granted several million acres to Oregon for the construction of 
a railroad from Portland southward to the California border, 
where such road would connect with another being built from 
Sacramento. Oregon was directed to designate a company to 
construct the railroad and to receive a land grant consisting 
of alternating sections of public lands within ten miles of the 
railway as a subsidy to offset its operating expenses. Three 
years later, after the grant's specified time limit passed without 
any companies taking the required steps to avail themselves 
of the grant, Congress renewed the grant but added conditions 
to ensure that land was sold to settlers, not speculators. Based 
on the new conditions, the railroad receiving the grant was 
required to dispose of the land only to "bona fide settlers," in 
parcels no larger than 160 acres, and for no more than $2.50 
per acre. Together, these conditions were commonly referred 
to as the "homestead clause." It was under this regime that 
the Oregon & California acquired the rights to more than three 
million acres stretching in a checkerboard pattern from the 
Coast Range to the Cascade Mountains and from Portland to 
the California border.9 
The Southern Pacific acquired control of the Oregon & 
California and its land grant in 1887, shortly after which the 
railway was completed. From that time until 1901, when 
Harriman acquired control of the Southern Pacific and its 
constituent railways, including the Oregon & California, the 
company pursued a policy of disposing of its lands quickly 
to develop the country and to build up long-term business 
for the road. Beginning in 1901, Harriman introduced new 
policies to oversee the railroad's use and disposal of the land 
grant. Although the various land departments of the constitu-
ent railroads had previously enjoyed much autonomy within 
the Southern Pacific system, Harriman sought to central-
ize authority and to develop a comprehensive land use plan, 
8See Samuel Dana, Forest and Range Policy: Its Development in the United 
States (New York, 1956),36-37, for a succinct summary of the legislative acts 
that created the land grants. 
90regon eiJ California Railroad Co. v. United States, 238 U.S. 393, 409 (1915). 
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whereby any of his railroads' lands would be used to benefit 
his entire system. 10 
5 
Harriman's strategy required an extensive review of the 
Southern Pacific's policies of land disposal up to that point. Re-
garding the Oregon & California land grant, the records showed 
that the railroad had disposed of 813,000 acres with little re-
gard for the homestead clause. In fact, only 127,000 acres were 
sold in compliance with that clause, while more than half were 
sold in parcels of more than two thousand acres. The average 
sale price was about five dollars an acre, double the maximum 
allowedY A large portion of the 813,000 acres was sold after 
1895, when lumber companies and investors became interested 
in Oregon's vast timber resources primarily for speculative 
purposes. From 1895 to 1901, the company disposed of 363,000 
acres to only thirty-eight buyers, with prices ranging from five 
dollars to forty dollars an acre. 12 
Although the homestead clause had little influence on the 
railroad's decisions regarding disposal of grant lands, the grant's 
other measure meant to ensure rapid settlement-its checker-
boarding provision-heavily constrained the railroad's activi-
ties. One of the principal purposes of checkerboarding was to 
ensure that lands along the railroad were settled and deVeloped 
rather than held in monopoly by the railroad or any successor 
in interest. This system, though, as applied to non-agricultural 
lands, had the effect of making it difficult for any entity to 
use the land for any purpose. The timberlands of Oregon, for 
example, were primarily, if not exclusively, valuable for their 
timber, but lumber operations required a solid body of land in 
order to extract timber at a profit. The Southern Pacific long 
recognized this fact, as did Harriman's land commissioner, 
Charles W. Eberlein, who complained that the checkerboard 
pattern of the railroad's grant made it virtually impossible for 
the railroad to dispose of the land, since timberlands could not 
be sold in a "piece-meal" fashion.]3 
JOCharles W. Eberlein, whom Harriman dispatched to San Francisco to oversee 
the land departments, later reported that Harriman's control was so tight that 
Eberlein was required to send all applications for purchase of timberlands to 
New York for Harriman to review and decide on a course of action. Transcript 
of Record, Supreme Court of the United States, no. 492, October term, 1916, 
Oregon eiJ California Railway Co. v. United States (hereinafter referred to as 
"Transcript"), available at The Making of Modern Law: U.S. Supreme Court 
Records and Briefs 2329, 2399, 2746, http://gdc.gale.com. 
llU.S. Congress, House Report, 60th Cong., 1st sess., 1908, no. 130l. 
l2Ellis, "Oregon and California Railroad Land Grant," 260-61. 
130rsi, Sunset Limited, 381; Transcript, 2328. 
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Harriman indeed found that the railroad's long-followed, 
pro-development policy of selling timberlands cheaply only 
encouraged speculation. This was both because the annual rise 
in value of the timber exceeded the taxes and interest pay-
ments required to retain the land, thus making it profitable 
simply to hold the land, and because there was not much of a 
market for the grant's timber, due to its relative inaccessibil-
ity as compared to the still-plentiful forests of Washington and 
California. Accordingly, only" a very, very small fraction" of 
the timberlands that the Oregon & California sold, including 
those it sold either directly or indirectly to lumber companies 
such as the Booth-Kelly Lumber Company, had been milled 
even by 1912. Based on these experiences, Eberlein ultimately 
concluded that /I anybody that comes in and wants to buy all 
the timber in [multiple] townships of land [had] no immediate 
intention of doing anything with it."14 Rather, the lands were 
simply "held for the rise. illS 
In 1903, citing the fact that the remaining lands were 
primarily heavily timbered and unsuitable for settlement, 
Harriman ordered the termination of all timberland sales in 
lands encompassed by the Oregon & California grant. 16 At 
the National Irrigation Congress of 1907, held in Sacramento, 
California, Harriman justified his decision to withhold the 
lands from sale based on the need for conservation. He insisted 
that his companies were not "holding those lands for specula-
tion" but instead were holding them lito protect [the people] 
in the future." Considering that "ties are the foundation of the 
transportation line," he stated his intent "to have a reserve 
with which we can maintain these great transportation lines 
for those that come after, that they may not accuse us of wast-
14Transcript, 2342--44. 
15Ibid. As another example of this phenomenon, Eberlein discussed the example 
of TB. Walker's handling of his timberlands in northeastern California: "They 
bought out timber concerns and mills and shut them down and they have ex-
isted all this time simply upon the increase in the growth of the timber which, 
as I have told you, is large enough in timber of certain age to more than equal 
the taxes and interest on the investmenti and in this particular case it must be 
remembered that this timber was sold by the Railroad on conditions that never 
were duplicated that I know of in this country." Transcript, 2351-52. 
16This policy was not limited to the Oregon & California land grant but rather 
applied to all lands of the Southern Pacific and Central Pacific as well. See 
Orsi, Sunset Limited, 123-25. 
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ing the resources which we had at our command. 1117 Harriman's 
1907 speech was consistent with a statement he made to a 
newspaper reporter that same year: 
The Southern Pacific will sell land to settlers, but not 
to speculators. We can tell a speculator from a settler as 
well as anyone. The agricultural land we will sell, but the 
timber-land we will retain, because we must have ties and 
bridge timbers, and we must retain our timber for future 
supply. The Southern Pacific has an insufficient amount 
of timber now, and we have had to buy large tracts, 
looking to the future supply of ties and material. Yes, we 
will sell to settlers, but speculators will get none. IS 
Harriman's goal, in other words, was to prevent harmful specu-
lation and to conserve the timber for future railroad use. 
At first glance, Harriman's conservationist justification 
seems inconsistent with the dominant brand of conservation 
represented by President Theodore Roosevelt and Gifford 
Pinchot, neither of whom ever advocated massive curtailing 
of development. Rather they advocated managing forests with 
the goal of promoting more efficient and prolonged develop-
ment without sacrificing present yield. At the meeting of the 
American Forestry Congress in 1905, immediately after which 
management of forests was transferred to the Department of 
Agriculture under the newly renamed Forest Service, Roosevelt 
assured pro-development westerners that the government's 
policy was /I consistent to give to every portion of the public 
domain its highest possible amount of use." 19 Pinchot added 
that If[tJhe administration of the forest reserves is based upon 
the general principle ... that the reserves are for use. They 
17The Official Proceedings of the 15th National Irrigation Congress, Septem-
ber 2-7, 1907, Sacramento, California; also quoted in House Committee on 
the Public Lands, Oregon and California Land Grants, 64th Cong., 1" sess., 
1916 (hereinafter referred to as the 0 eJ C Land Grants), 143-44. See W.G. 
Robbins, "Lumber Production and Community Stability: A View from the 
Pacific Northwest," Journal of Forest History 31:4 (October 1987): 187-96; 
Wesley C. Ballaine, "The Revested Oregon and California Railroad Grant 
Lands: A Problem in Land Management," Land Economics 29:3 (August 1953): 
219-32; John Messing, "Public Lands, Politics, and Progressives: The Oregon 
Land Fraud Trials, 1903-1910," Pacific Historical Review 35:1 (February 
1966): 35-66. 
18Transcript, 4267. According to Orsi, this statement may have been a lie, based 
on the fact that the initial sale order applied to all lands, and very few sales oc-
curred on any lands during Harriman's tenure. See Orsi, Sunset Limited, 124-25. 
19 American Forestry Association, Proceedings of the American Forest Con-
gress, January 2-6,1905, Washington, D.C. (Washington, DC, 1905), 11. 
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must be useful first of all to the people of the neighborhood in 
which they lie. Ii 20 On their face, Harriman's policies appeared 
to violate this simple rule of conservation. 
Assuming that Harriman's no-sale rule thwarted develop-
ment, it would indeed seem that his policies contradicted the 
very conservationist principles he attempted to evoke. However, 
it is not at all clear that his policy impacted development at all. 
As of the time when Harriman issued his no-sale order, there 
were not many settlers on the land, even after decades of efforts 
to attract farmers from the East. Moreover, as the railroad's land 
commissioner Eberlein reported, almost all of the lands in the 
possession of lumber companies were simply being held, likely 
because of their inaccessibility and distance from markets. That 
the lack of development was due more to physical and economic 
geography than to Harriman's decisions would later be con-
firmed by both government reports and the government's own 
experiences once it reacquired the lands in 1916.21 
Given these realities, which Harriman and his men appreci-
ated long before Congress did, Harriman's termination of land 
sales can be seen not as anti-development but as a recogni-
tion that the market system, in this instance, had failed-and 
would likely continue to fail-to promote the rational, efficient 
use the land's natural resources. This rationale was thus 
consistent with the conservation movement, which was, above 
all-as Samuel P. Hays has articulated-a scientific movement 
advocating that scientists take the lead in determining natural 
resource use rather than leaving such questions to political or 
economic forces.n Harriman was both a benefactor and a con-
sumer of the emerging sciences of conservation. 
Harriman had already demonstrated his personal support of 
the natural sciences when he arranged and funded a maritime 
expedition to Alaska in 1899. What began as a vacation for him 
and his family was radically transformed when Harriman con-
ceived of inviting an entire community of scientists to explore 
and document the coastlines of Alaska. The expedition included 
biologists, botanists, geographers, geologists, and zoologists, as 
well as several artists and intellectual writers. Scientists and 
intellectuals who accepted Harriman's invitation to partici-
pate included John A. Muir; C. Hart Merriam, chief of the U.S. 
2°American Forestry Association, Proceedings of the American Forest Con-
gress, 392. 
21See Wesley C. Ballaine, "The Revested Oregon and California Railroad Grant 
Lands: A Problem in Land Management," Land Economics 29 (August 1953): 224. 
22Samuel P. Hays, Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency: The Progressive 
Conservation Movement, 1890-1920 (Pittsburgh, PA, 1999),3. 
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Biological Survey; William E. Ritter, president of the California 
Academy of Sciences; Henry Gannett, chief of the u.S. Coast 
and Geodetic Survey; George B. Grinnell, editor of Forest and 
Stream; and Bernhard E. Fernow, former chief of the Department 
of Agriculture's Division of Forestry.23 In the decade following 
their time together on what was referred to as the "Harriman 
Expedition," Muir and Harriman maintained a regular corre-
spondence a:o.d formed what environmental historian Donald 
Worster has labeled" an improbable bond" based on a "mutual 
understanding ... [ofJ the value of an efficient railroad system 
and on the wisdom of establishing national parks. t124 Worster re-
cently argued that, from the expedition until Harriman's death a 
decade later, Muir saw Harriman" as a well-meaning friend and 
potential ally of the conservation movement. 1125 
Harriman was also a consumer of conservation science. In 1902, 
he personally applied to the Bureau of Forestry for experts to be dis-
patched to Arden House, his IS,OOD-acre estate in Orange County, 
New York, to advise him on how to conserve the estate's 8,000 
acres of dense forest.26 On receiving Harriman's request, the bureau 
sent nine men instead of the normal two to develop a working 
plan for iIllproving Harriman's timber. The foresters reported being 
excited at the opportunity to use "ingenious methods" for examin-
ing the abilities of various species of trees to bear shade, to repro-
duce, and to withstand damage from forest firesP The nine forestry 
students completed the necessary fieldwork between April 1 and 
June IS, during which time they created a forest map of the entire 
tract and compiled, according to the Department of Agriculture's 
annual report, 1/ a careful study of the forest, by which its character, 
condition, present stand, and future yield were ascertained. 1128 
There is also evidence that Harriman was motivated not just 
by a form of utilitarian conservation but also by a preservation-
ist ethos. After visiting Harriman's New York estate, Muir, for 
one, concluded that Harriman indeed loved the forest and its 
23See "The Harriman Expedition," Los Angeles Times, August 1,1899. 
24Donald Worster, A Passion for Nature: The Life of Tohn Muir (New York, 
2008),408. 
25Jbid., 362-63. 
26In 1898, as head of the Division of Forestry, Pinchot had issued "Circular 21." 
This document offered to assist private landowners to develop plans for forest 
management and fire protection, provided that the owners paid all expenses. 
Thomas R. Cox et al., This Well· Wooded Land: Americans and Their Forests 
from Colonial Times to the Present (Lincoln, NE, 1985). 
27"To Improve the Harriman Forest," New York Times, April 20, 1902. 
2BU.S. Department of Agriculture, Annual Reports of the Department of 
Agriculture for the Fiscal Year Ended Tune 30,1902. Report of the Secretary of 
Agriculture, Departmental Reports (Washington, DC, 1902). 
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Memhersof the Harriman Expedition and some acquaintances 
gather at Dutch Harhor, Alaskaf July 1899. (Courtesy of University 
of Washington Librariesf Special Collections. Negative number 
Harriman 187) 
wildlife and considered it something to cherish and conserve, 
at least when consistent with economic development. Beyond 
preserving his own timbered estate, Harriman's desire to leave 
certain places alone was also demonstrated in 1905 when he 
lobbied in support of the Sierra Clubfs efforts to incorporate the 
Yosemite Valley into the national park that then surrounded it. 
Later, in his 1907 speech before the National Irrigation Con-
gress, he showed an aesthetic concern for the preservation of 
Oregonfs natural beauty, He argued that flOregon ought to be the 
country's playground. There's a vastness of fine scenery there.Jl29 
Through his words and actions, Harriman was able to convince 
Muir of his concern for nature beyond its mere economic value. 
In spring 1909, when Muir was visiting Harriman and his family 
in Pasadena, California, Muir was asked how he, II a nature lover, 
[could] happen to be visiting a cold-blooded financier." He an-
swered, reportedly while fighting back tears, that "Mr. Harriman 
has a heart, People may not know it, but he loves the flowers 
and the trees, He loves nature and human nature. '130 
29"Magnate Wins Applause for Fanny Speech," San Francisco Call, September 5, 1907. 
30"Sidetracks All Callers," Los Angeles Times, March 17, 1909. 
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Importantly, the people of Oregon also took Harriman at his 
word. While historians have questioned Harriman's motives 
in ordering the termination of land sales, Oregonians believed 
his stated rationale, and this is precisely why they became so 
angered. Harriman's no-sale order and his subsequent explana-
tion enraged a wide cross-section of the public, particularly 
in the affected localities of Oregon. Encouraged by prominent 
lumber companies in the state, local residents accused Harriman 
of undermining Oregon's development by locking up its natural 
resources. While the backlash against Harriman undoubtedly fed 
off a populist distrust of railroads as malevolent monopolies that 
threatened to hold local populations hostage to their economic 
whims, people also linked Harriman to what they saw as an 
equally menacing force: the eastern conservation movement. In 
the weeks following his 1907 speech at Sacramento, the Orego-
nian accused Harriman of desiring "to make areserve out of 
the whole of Oregon./I In fact, said the paper, "he counts it his 
reserve now." 31 
31Excerpted in "Mr. Harriman's Apology Not Accepted," San Francisco Call, 
September 17, 1907. 
Architect William H. Holabird, E.H. Harriman, and John Muir (left to right) 
posed together at Harriman's lodge in Pelican Bay, Oregon. {Courtesy of 
John Muir Papers, Holt-Atherton Special Collections, University of the 
Pacific Library, MSS04.F25-1386.Copyright 1984 Muir-Hanna Trust) 
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The Oregonian questioned not just Harriman's motivations, 
but those of all who purported to be concerned with conserva-
tion: "[TJhis state is plastered from one end to the other with 
timber speculators in syndicates and as individuals. All pretend 
to be saving for the nation a wood supply. The truth is they are 
keeping out settlement and maintaining a wilderness in order at 
some future day to gratify lust for wealth. 1132 The Oregonian 
believed that the state needed, above all, "the clearing up of forest 
land" near the railroads so that it could "be used for agriculture 
and for sustaining a larger population."33 To the people along 
the Oregon & California line, whether Harriman epitomized the 
speculator or the conservationist was immaterial, since the con-
servationist was merely a new form of speculator. Both were seen 
as equally threatening to the rapid development of the region. 
Based on Harriman's apparent refusal to sell much, if not all, 
of the remaining land grant, Senator Benjamin R. Tillman of 
South Carolina introduced, and Congress quickly passed, legisla-
tion authorizing the attorney general to institute proceedings for 
the forfeiture of the railroad's unsold lands. Attorney General 
George W. Wickersham complied and filed suit in September 
1908 against the railroad, one of its creditors, and many indi-
viduals and companies who had purchased lands in violation of 
the grant's terms.34 Although the no-sale order precipitated the 
lawsuit, the many sales the railroad made prior to 1903 in viola-
tion of the homestead clause served as its legal justification. 
3211Mr. Harriman's Apology Not Accepted." 
33Ibid. Historian Roy M. Robbins argues that the West during this time was not 
anti-conservationist at all but instead was opposed to government intervention 
based on the government's past promotion of land theft, including most notably 
the Forest Lieu Land Act of 1897. Roy M. Robbins, Our Landed Heritage: 
The Public Domain, 1776-1936 (Lincoln, NE, 1962), 338-40. Carlos Arnaldo 
Schwantes, however, insists that western resistance was based on a rational fear 
that the conservation ethos, despite Roosevelt's assertions to the contrary, would 
only serve to tie up resources and inhibit growth. Schwantes, The Pacific North-
west: An Interpretive History, rev. and enl. ed. (Lincoln, NE, 1996), 22l. 
34In 1912, Congress passed the Forgiveness Act, 37 Stat. 320, which dropped 
the government's claims against individuals and companies that had purchased 
large tracts of land in good faith and without knowledge of the grant's home-
stead clause forbidding such sales. This legislation was passed in no small part 
because the lawyers at the Department of Justice had convinced members of 
Congress that the individuals who purchased the affected 524,000 acres were 
"small fry" settlers and were so numerous that litigation would be virtually 
unending, meaning also that the land would be tied up for decades. It was later 
revealed that several of the purchasers were lumber companies and other inter-
ests that had purchased tracts in excess of 10,000 acres, and many of these "in-
nocent purchasers" had been indicted-and some convicted-in the land fraud 
trials of 1905-1907. See 0 eV C Land Grants, 203. The Forgiveness Act allowed 
innocent purchasers to keep title so long as they paid the government $2.50 per 
acre, even though some of the land was worth as much as $500 per acre. 
WINTER/SPRING 2010 RAILROADS MUST HAVE TIES 13 
Seeming to contradict the Harriman regime's assessment of 
the grant lands was the fact that, beginning in 1907 and con-
tinuing for the entire seven years of litigation, thousands of 
individuals filed applications with the railroad company for the 
purchase of quarter sections. In that year, as the political move-
ment to force the forfeiture of the land grant gained momen-
tum, residents of Oregon began "rushing into the rich timber 
country and gobbling it up." 35 This movement apparently was 
based on the government's indications that, once individuals 
offered to purchase lands at $2.50 an acre and were refused, 
they would then have standing to sue the railroad to force such 
sales and would "have a pretty good case."36 The Wall Street 
Journal reported" a frenzy of excitement" in Oregon, where 
"thousands are leaving home and stampeding to the railroad 
land grants ... to force Harriman to surrender" the landY By 
June 1907, it was reported that "in many counties every quar-
ter section of the land held by the railroad has a claimant. "38 
Although the government later used these claims as evi-
dence that the land was indeed capable of being settled under 
the hom~stead clause-contrary to the claims of Harriman and 
his railroad-it appears that the vast majority of the applicants 
in fact had no intention of homesteading on their claims .. In his 
extensive overview of the Oregon & California land grant, 
David Maldwyn Ellis concluded that "these so-called settlers 
were speculators or dummies for speculators who hoped to 
make good their title to valuable timberlands at a nominal 
sum."39 Indeed, "practically all" of the 14,000 to 15,000 ap-
plications to buy land from the railroad company during this 
time period, according to Ellis, "were speculative in character," 
a fact that was revealed over the next decade as the Department 
of Justice convicted nine professional locators, each representing 
several hundred applicants, for fraud in connection with these 
purported applications for purchase and actual settlement.40 
3511Ignorant Oregon Farmers," Washington Post, June 4, 1907. 
36Ibid. As it turned out, they did not have a good case; the Supreme Court 
ultimately dismissed the claims of these prospective purchasers. Based on the 
fact that the grant did not compel the railroad to sell and did not even define 
II actual settler," the prospective purchasers did not have any right to enforce 
the grant's conditions, according to the Court. Oregon eiJ California Railroad 
Co., 238 U.S. at 434-35. 
3711After Harriman Road's Land," Wall Street Journai, June 5,1907. 
38Jbid. 
39Ellis, "0regon and California Railroad Land Grant," 264. 
40See Ellis, "Oregon and California Railroad Land Grant," 268. 
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Testimony in divestiture trial corroborated Harriman's 
assessment that the vast majority of the land was unsuitable 
for the type of homesteading that Congress had envisioned 
and the grant required. In fact, in all of his work in the rail-
road's land department since he was first employed in 1889, 
EA. Elliott could not remember a single instance in which 
the railroad had sold a quarter section to a person who then 
actually made a home and a living on that acreage.41 The same 
apparently was true on the even sections within the grant; 
Homer D. Angell, a surveyor for the railroad and the govern-
ment, observed that "lands acquired by homestead from the 
government on timbered areas are never occupied for any 
appreciable period after has been acquired."42 In many 
cases, those who attempted to establish homesteads on these 
lands failed. Elliott noted that the few improvements that had 
existed on these lands in the 1880s had, by the first decade of 
the twentieth century, "grown up to brush. "43 
Regardless of the wisdom of congressional policy, the fed-
eral government at first appeared to have the law on its side. 
In 1913 the district court ruled in the government's favor by 
decreeing the unsold grant lands forfeited and quieting the 
government's title to such lands. The railroad, however, ap-
pealed this decision on several legal grounds, including that 
the homestead clause constituted not a condition subsequent 
justifying forfeiture, but rather a set of restrictive and unen-
forceable covenants, and alternatively that the government had 
waived its right to enforcement of the provision through its 
years of acquiescence. In delivering the opinion of the Supreme 
Court, Justice Joseph McKenna agreed with the railroad that 
the homestead clause lacked the required technical language 
to constitute a condition subsequent touching the railroad's 
property interest, but he also disagreed with the railroad's 
contentions that the conditions were unenforceable. He held 
instead that the grant's conditions constituted both contractual 
covenants and laws, and thus were strictly enforceable. 
As to the appropriate remedy, however, the Court agreed 
with the railroad's contention that the land invited "more to 
speculation than to settlement. "44 It therefore declined to order 
the railroad to sell the remaining lands pursuant to the terms 
of the grant or merely to enjoin the railroad from violating the 




440regon eJ California RailroadCo., 238 U.S. at 438. 
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homestead clause was unworkable as applied to the remaining 
grant lands, it enjoined the railroad from /I any disposition of 
them whatever or of the timber thereon, and from cutting or 
authorizing the cutting or removal of any of the timber there-
on, II and it directed Congress to provide by legislation for their 
disposition in accordance with such policy as it may deem 
"fitting under the circumstances. "45 In disposing of the lands, 
Congress was required to secure to the railroad /I all the value 
the granting acts conferred upon the railroads. 1146 
In deciding how to dispose of the lands, some in Congress 
insisted that the lands were still amenable to the type of settle-
ment that Congress originally had contemplated, despite all 
the evidence to the contrary. Representative Willis C. Hawley 
from Oregon, for example, claimed to have received 1/ a large 
number of letters from men ... stating that there have been 
people living on these lands, with good houses and good im-
provements, who settled on the lands and made their improve-
ments in good faith and are living there and have been making 
a home for a number of years on the land."47 "All through the 
grant," he insisted, "with the exception of comparatively small 
areas, there are farms of agricultural lands. 1148 Representative 
Clifton N. McArthur; also from Oregon; however, disputed 
Hawley's claims. He cited a joint investigation conducted by 
the Interior, Justice, and Post Office departments, which found 
that 1/ all but a comparatively small percentage/f of the thou-
sands of applications for the purchase of land from the railroad 
were IIsecured by so-called locators," and that there were "very 
few, if any, actual settlers on these lands" as of 1916.49 
The interests of Oregonians weighed heavily on Congress' 
deliberations. Immediately after the Supreme Court delivered 
its opinion, the governor of Oregon called together delegates in 
Salem to discuss the matter. The conference attendees resolved 
that Congress should II enact laws defining settling who 
shall be considered actual settlers ... and what shall be con-
sidered an actual settlement, and requiring the [railroad] to 
perform the terms and conditions of the [grant] and to sell and 
dispose of said lands according to the true intent and purpose of 
45Ibid. 
460regon ei! California Railroad Co., 238 U.S. at 439. 
470 ei! C Land Grants, 187. 
48Ibid./ 188. Clay Tallman, commissioner of the General Land Office, corrobo-
rated Hawley's testimony by estimating that as much as 75 percent of the land 
was suitable for settlement and cultivation. 
490 ei! C Land Grants, 203, 251. 
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[the grantj."so They also declared their "unalterable" opposition 
to the creation or enlargement of any forest reserves in Oregon. 
They proposed, instead, that Congress provide for the immedi-
ate sale of grant lands under the conditions of the homestead 
clause, while also protecting the process from fraud. 51 Despite 
the appearance of unanimity, however, McArthur contended 
that Oregonians were in fact divided on how the lands should 
be handled. He cited the fact that, immediately after the 
conference passed its initial resolutions, it passed a new set 
of resolutions directing the conference chairman to form a 
committee to negotiate a settlement with the Southern Pacific 
that could then be presented to Congress, the apparent purpose 
being, above all, to avoid a prolonged dispute.52 
The politicians from Oregon largely followed suit in argu-
ing that Congress should provide for actual settlement of the 
lands. For his part, Senator George Chamberlain, whose bill 
dominated the debate in Congress and ultimately was passed, 
reported that he realized, after Harriman's speech at the Irriga-
tion Congress in 1907, "the importance to the people of the 
State to have these lands brought under actual settlement by 
sale or otherwise so as to assist the State in its development 
and in the purposes of government."S3 Although he claimed to 
be "nearly alone in the West ... in defending the policies of the 
Forestry Service" and to have been /I one of the original advo-
cates of that for the welfare of the people, with Mr. Pinchot," 
he argued that no more lands in Oregon, except those that were 
deemed necessary to protect water supplies, should be added to 
the forest reserves.54 Representative Hawley purported to relay 
his constituents' demands "that no part of the lands be placed 
in the forest reserves; that all of these lands be made available 
for development under proper conditions; that all lands capable 
of any agricultural use be disposed of for that purpose; that the 
just rights of the State and counties of Oregon be recognized 
and provided for; that provision be made for the payment of 
accrued taxes; and that all of these lands remain on the tax 
rolls. 1155 Finally, Representative McArthur insisted that what 
Oregonians wanted most were If actual settlers, people who will 
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communities that will be of material benefit to the develop-
ment of the state. 1156 
17 
A report submitted by the Department of Agriculture, as well 
as the testimony of department officials, not only confirmed 
the railroad's assessment of the unsuitability of the grant lands 
for settlement, but also implicitly vindicated both the railroad's 
policy of selling timberlands in large tracts prior to 1903 and its 
termination of land sales after that date. The department con-
sidered II some" of the lands to be agricultural, but it determined 
that "most of it was heavily timbered."s7 Furthermore, just as 
the railroad had found it untenable to sell heavily timbered 
lands in 160-acre legal subdivisions, the department's report 
criticized any attempt to limit land sales to small legal subdivi-
sions as "not consistent with the natural requirements of the 
industry. 1158 Assistant Forester William B. Greeley testified that 
limiting sales by 1/ any legal subdivision" would "likely lead to 
mismanagement/' and he encouraged Congress to leave it to 
the Interior or Agriculture department to make sales "in accor-
dance with the topography-normally by watershed-and the 
natural logging factors. "59 He indicated that even sales in excess 
of 20,000 acres could be justified. FinallYI the Department of 
Agriculture confirmed Harriman's contention that there was 
little market for the immediate consumption of timber and that 
any purchases of timberlands would be at very low prices and 
only for speculative purposes. Based on western Oregon's market 
position, the department reported that "it [was] obvious that 
vast quantities of privately owned timber must be held for many 
decades before it can be marketed" for consumption. Thus the 
department recommended holding the lands from sale, except in 
the few cases where local mills demanded stumpage, until such 
time-possibly even decades into the future-that the market 
conditions changed considerably.60 
56Ibid., 20l. 
5lIbid., 219. Regarding those timberlands deemed agricultural, Assistant 
Forester William B. Greeley testified that the costs of clearing timber for the 
purposes of cultivation-which could be as much as $400 per acre-would be 
"relatively heavy," the clear insinuation being that such costs would act as an 
economic barrier to such development. 0 eiJ C Land Grants, 240. 
58Ibid., 224. 
59Ibid., 242. 
6°Ibid., 220-22. Of course, representatives from the U.s. Forest Service differed 
from the railroad's policy in one important respect: it pushed for all of the 
timberlands to be held in public ownership under the jurisdiction of the For-
est Service. Even this, however, was not based on a distrust of the railroad's 
motives, but rather on a concern that carrying the lands would be too heavy a 
burden for any private party. See 0 eiJ C Land Grants, 236-37. 
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Unfortunately, Congress disregarded many of the observa-
tions and recommendations of the Department of Agriculture 
in its Chamberlain-Ferris Act of 1916. This act revested the 
remaining grant lands in the federal government and provided 
for their sale as well as the disposal of the timber upon them. 
Rather than providing for the efficient management of the 
forests pursuant to conservationist principles, as government 
foresters had advised, the act directed the secretary of the inte-
rior to sell off the timber to the highest bidder, at which time 
the timberlands could be reclassified as agricultural land and 
opened for settlement. Moreover, Congress disregarded Sec-
retary David F. Houston's recommendations that any sales of 
timberlands be in large tracts and not according to legal subdi-
vision when it instead provided that each legal subdivision be 
offered for sale separately before any larger sales were made. 
Finally, in designating that proceeds from land and timber sales 
in excess of the amount owed to the railroad would adequately 
compensate the Oregon counties for tax revenues lost as a re-
sult of the land's being ordered forfeited in 1913 and ultimately 
transferred to public ownership in 1916, Congress failed to 
heed the department's advice regarding the lack of an immedi-
ate market for standing timber and the extent to which the im-
mediate sale of timber would depress its price.61 Sure enough, 
sales were slow, the system Congress created proved unwork-
able, and the counties were on the verge of economic collapse 
in 1926, when Congress approved a loan to the counties in the 
amount of lost tax revenues and passed a new formula for dis-
tributing the revenues from the lands. 
With its 1916 legislation, Congress exchanged a land regime 
in which the railroad had demonstrated its interest in manag-
ing the lands for long-term sustainability for one that perpetu-
ated the federal government's nineteenth-century approach 
to public lands. All of this occurred despite the concerns 
expressed by the prior generation over the exhaustibility of the 
61Chamberlain-Ferris Act of June 9, 1916, U.S. Statutes at Large, 64th Cong., 
Is' sess., ch. 137,39 Stat. 218. After the district court's decree of forfeiture on 
July I, 1913, the railroad stopped paying taxes on unsold lands. Prior to the 
forfeiture, the railroad had paid a total of $1,820,000 in taxes on the land, much 
of which was in recent years due to the increased assessed value of the lands. 
In his testimony before the congressional committee considering the Oregon 
&. California land grant, government attorney Stephen W. Williams estimated 
that the tax burden had increased tenfold in the previous ten years and that the 
railroad owed about $1.3 million in unpaid taxes for the previous three years. 
o ei! C Land Grants, 6. The Department of Justice'S report recommended that 
the government pay the back taxes immediately, not only in fairness to the 
adversely impacted counties, but also to remove the "cloud upon the Govern-
ment's title," which would "embarrass any attempt to dispose of the lands to 
settlers." 0 ei! C Land Grants, 26. 
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nation's natural resources and over the waste and possible ir-
reversible damage that resulted (and would continue to result) 
from the government's promotion of immediate development. 
The actions of Harriman and his Oregon & California rail-
road were consistent with conservationist principlesj Harriman 
and other railroad officials repeatedly expressed a concern for 
guaranteeing a sustainable supply of timber both to guaran-
tee a permanent supply for the railroad's operations and to 
facilitate the continued prosperity of the region on which the 
railroad depended. The myth regarding conservation portrays 
the battle over control of the natural environment as one pit-
ting "the people," as represented by conservationists, against 
"the interests" represented by industrialists and capitalists. 
According to this myth, Harriman cannot be considered a 
conservationist because he was a capitalist who was motivated 
by self-interest, namely the continued economic viability of his 
railroad empire, in addition to any concerns he may have held 
for the general public welfare. This case, however, serves as a 
prime illustration of Samuel P. Hays' influential thesis that the 
Progressive conservation movement was not, in fact, a crusade 
of the people against the trusts, as many Progressives tried to 
argue.62 Those economic, political, and legal actors supposedly 
least responsive to the needs or demands of "the people"-a 
railroad tycoon and appointed federal bureaucrats-were the 
first to realize that the lands of the Oregon & California grant 
should be managed as forests with an appreciation of the needs 
of future generations, while the people and their representa-
tives in Congress continued to push for the clearing of tim-
berlands and the perpetuation of the homestead policy of the 
nineteenth century. 
President Calvin Coolidge would later complain about the 
land-grant railroads' ability to use the law as an instrument not 
only to insulate themselves from prosecution for their supposed 
subversions of federal land-grant policies, but also to secure 
additional benefits contrary to the interests of the public and 
the government in efficiently managing the nation's natural 
62Hays, Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency. See also James L. Penick, 
Progressive Politics and Conservation: Ballinger-Pinchot Affair (Chicago, 1968) 
(detailing Ballinger's criticisms of Pinchot's policies as favoring the eastern 
corporate interests at the expense of western individuals); Louis S. Warren, The 
Hunter's Game: Poachers and Conservationists in Twentieth-Century America 
(New Haven, CT, 1997) (exploring the tensions between local autonomy and 
national control in regard to wildlife and the impact of conservation on local 
interests); Karl Jacoby, Crimes against Nature: Squatters, Poachers, Thieves, 
and the Hidden History of American Conservation (Berkeley, CA, 2001) 
(depicting the national conservation movement as a tool of colonization and 
state-building). 
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resources.63 However, the experiences of the Oregon & California 
during the first decades of the twentieth century provide a far 
different narrative. While certainly corroborating Coolidge's la-
ment that law had operated to inhibit effective management of 
natural resources, the Oregon & California's experiences show, 
at least in this important instance, that it was the government, 
and not the raihoad, that used outdated laws as instruments to 
block conservationist advances, and it was the raihoad, and not 
the democratically elected branches of government, that sought 
cooperation with the federal bureaucracy to implement manage-
ment regimes that would ensure sustainable economic develop-
ment, even if at the cost of short-term gains. 
That Harriman had a profit motive in seeking to ensure a 
continuous supply of timber for the maintenance of his raihoad 
empire should not undermine his conservationist credentials. 
Indeed, notable conservationists within the federal forest 
bureaucracy recognized that the movement depended on the 
willing participation of business interests. Writing just a year 
before Harriman's termination of land sales, for example, 
former chief of the Division of Forestry Bernhard E. Fernow 
predicted that wealthy capitalists like Harriman, "who can 
see the financial advantages of the future in forest properties," 
would quickly become the newest" class" of conservationists. 
Fernow thus concluded that, aside from being owned by the 
government, forest resources were most likely to be conserved 
when in "the hands of perpetual corporations and wealthy 
owners."64 Other conservationists, including Pinchot, recog-
nized that their movement would succeed only when private 
commercial entities appreciated the extent to which their 
continued prosperity depended on the rational management 
of natural resources.65 As Roosevelt asserted at the American 
Forest Congress in 1905, the conservation movement-as well 
as America's continued economic growth-would depend not 
on philanthropists or the general public, but on "the men who 
are actively interested in the use of the forest in one way or 
another."66 Harriman agreed with Roosevelt's assessment that 
"the raihoads must have ties," and thus he was among the first 
to answer the conservationists' call. 
63u.s. House Report 512, Northern Pacific Land Grants, 68th Cong., 1st sess., 1-2. 
64Bernhard E. Fernow, Economics of Forestry: A Reference Book for Students of 
Political Economy and Professional and Lay Students of Forestry (New Yor~ 
1902), 345-46. 
65 American Forestry Association, Proceedings of the American Forest Con-
gress, 390-93. 
66Jbid., 6-8. 
